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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS A BASIS
FOR REFUGEE STATUS: PROTECTION
FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF FREEDOM
OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION
Karen Musalo
Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, United States
It is beyond dispute that sovereign nations have the right to raise and maintain armies. 
This right may come in confl ict with the right to conscientious objection, which has 
increasingly been recognized as a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. Individuals who face mandatory military service in contravention of their 
deep moral convictions, may fl ee their home countries, and seek refugee status abroad 
as a solution. Their recognition as refugees depends on a broad constellation of factors, 
including the particular basis for their refusal to serve, the nature of the military confl ict 
itself, and the degree to which the State in which they seek asylum follows the guidance 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the issue of draft 
evasion and desertion as a basis for protection.
This article will examine the trends regarding the protection of the individual 
whose claim to refugee status is premised upon a conscientious objection to military 
service. It will begin by examining the internationally recognized right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, and discuss its relationship to conscientious objection. 
It will then examine the position and underlying rationale of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees on the issue. It will look at the trends in a number of 
common law countries, and evaluate the degree to which UNHCR guidance and other 
relevant human rights norms are respected. It will conclude by recommending a more 
robust protection of individuals of conscience who do not want to participate in the 
military.
Keywords: Freedom of religion, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
conscientious objection and refugee status.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP 
TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION
A conscientious objection to military service is one that is premised on deeply-
held beliefs. It can manifest as pacifi sm – an objection to fi ghting in all wars – or 
it can be a selective objection to a particular confl ict. The Offi ce of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights recently characterized conscientious objection 
as an objection to service based on “principles and reasons of conscience, including 
profound convictions, arising from religious, moral, ethical, humanitarian or other 
motives.”1
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Although the right to conscientious objection is not expressly recognized by 
relevant international instruments, many scholars have remarked upon the “recent 
and well-established trend in the international community”2 to interpret the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as encompassing the right to 
conscientious objection.
The recognition of freedom of religion or belief as a fundamental human right 
is well-established in numerous international3 and regional instruments.4 Although 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion had limited recognition 
in international law as early as the sixteenth century,5 it was with the establishment 
of the United Nations that the right has its origins as an international norm. Art. 
18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) specifi cally6 addresses 
the right as follows:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, wor ship and observance.7
The principles articulated in the UDHR were incorporated into Art. 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and in 1981 
the U.N. General Assembly adopted by unanimous vote the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion 
or Belief.8
Whether conscientious objection is itself an internationally recognized 
right – or simply an emerging human rights norm – has been a matter of some 
controversy. In 1985, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which monitors the 
ICCPR’s implementation, stated that the Covenant did not provide for the right 
to conscientious objection.9 However, in 1993 it reversed its position, stating 
that although the “Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious 
objection, ...the committee believes that such a right can be derived from article 
18, inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously confl ict with the 
freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief.”10
Resolutions issued by the U.N. Human Rights Commission have been in 
accord with this evolving recognition. In 1987, the Commission appealed to 
States to “recognize that conscientious objection to military service should be 
considered a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion.11 In 1995, the Commission once again noted “the right of everyone 
to have conscientious objections to military service as a legitimate exercise of the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion[.]”12 It reiterated this position 
once more in 1998.13
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS A BASIS FOR REFUGEE STATUS
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee Status has addressed 
conscientious objection as a basis for refugee status in its Handbook,14 as well as 
in it recently released Religion Guidelines.15 In a section of the Handbook entitled 
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“Special Cases”, UNHCR sets forth a framework for determining when refugee 
status may be premised upon draft evasion or desertion.
The Handbook begins its analysis by stating the widely accepted rule that 
punishment for evasion or desertion is not normally considered to be persecution, 
and that aversion to military service, or fear of combat are not legitimate reasons 
for refusal to serve.16 However, the Handbook carves out two exceptions to the 
general rule that it is not persecution to require military service; relevant for our 
purposes is the exception which arises when the “performance of military service 
would have required ...participation in military action contrary to ...genuine 
political, religious, or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience.”17
The individual who objects for religious, moral or valid reasons of conscience 
must demonstrate the sincerity of his beliefs, the fact that military service is 
obligatory, and that the State provides no accommodation for these beliefs.18 A 
failure of accommodation could be based upon a showing that State law does not 
provide an exemption for conscientious objectors, and that young men only have 
the option of serving or being punished for refusal to serve. The individual whose 
objections to military service are based on political convictions; i.e., the person 
who is “in disagreement with his government regarding the political justifi cation 
for a particular military action,” must meet one additional criteria; he must 
establish that the type of military action to which he objects “is condemned by the 
international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct.”19
The recommendation of refugee status for those who refuse service for reasons 
of conscience was reaffi rmed by UNHCR in its Religion Guidelines, which state:
Where military service is compulsory, refugee status may be established if the 
refusal to serve is based on genuine political, religious, or moral convictions, or 
valid reasons of conscience.... Prosecution and punishment pursuant to a law 
of general application is not generally considered to constitute persecution... 
In conscientious objector cases, a law purporting to be of general application 
may, depending on the circumstances, nonetheless be persecutory where, 
for instance....the military service cannot reasonably be expected to be 
performed by the individual because of his or her genuine beliefs or religious 
convictions.20
Furthermore, this approach has been explicitly adopted by the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Included in its list of “best practices” in 
relation to implementation of the right to conscientious objection, is the policy 
that “asylum should be granted to those conscientious objectors compelled to leave 
their country of origin because they fear persecution owing to their refusal to 
perform military service.”21
A SURVEY OF STATE PRACTICES ON REFUGEE STATUS 
FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
Notwithstanding the strong recommendation of UNHCR and the UNHCHR, 
States have erected many jurisprudential barriers to deny refugee protection to 
conscientious objectors. As will be discussed below, the U.S. has often employed 
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an overly formalistic nexus analysis to deny protection to religiously-motivated 
conscientious objectors. In cases involving American conscientious objectors to 
the U.S. war in Iraq, Canada has adopted a troubling approach to determining 
whether the military service “is condemned by the international community as 
contrary to basic rules of human conduct” as required by the U.N. Handbook in 
cases involving objections based on political convictions. There have been some 
positive developments in jurisprudence in the U.K., but resistance to recognizing 
the right to conscientious objection as an internationally protected right has 
resulted in denial of protection. Disappointingly, the recent Qualifi cation 
Directive22 which sets forth standards for refugee norms within the European 
Union, has taken an overly narrow approach which is inconsistent with more 
positive developments within the E.U. on the issue of conscientious objection, 
and which will serve to thwart expanded protections. In contrast, New Zealand 




In 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the refugee defi nition’s requirement 
that persecution be “on account of ” one of the fi ve Convention grounds required 
proof of the persecutor’s motivation. This interpretive approach, which has 
been broadly criticized,23 has adversely impacted claims for refugee status based 
on conscientious objection – especially religiously-motivated conscientious 
objection – because courts have consistently ruled that the government’s intent 
was to raise an army, not to persecute the applicant for his or her religion or 
belief. The landmark case on this issue is Cañas-Segovia v. INS,24 ruling that it is 
not religious persecution to punish Jehovah’s Witnesses25 for refusing to perform 
military service.26
However, even with the obstacle to religiously-motivated conscientious 
objection cases posed by the intent requirement, there have been some U.S. 
decisions recognizing the viability of such claims. These cases generally involve an 
element of disproportionate punishment and/or pervasive discrimination against 
the religious group in question, and it is these factors that result in a grant of 
protection.27
Political Conviction Claims
As noted in the discussion of the Handbook’s guidance, objectors whose refusal 
to serve is based on political disagreement with the military action must make the 
additional showing that the military action be “condemned by the international 
community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct[.]” Some cases in the 
U.S. have not fared well because of the standard employed to determine whether 
or not the military action meets this standard. Several cases have interpreted the 
U.N. Handbook as requiring an actual U.N. resolution condemning the military 
action.28
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Canada
Canada has generally taken a more humanitarian-oriented approach on 
conscientious objection cases. It has not followed the “intent” requirement of the 
United States, but has adopted a nexus analysis which looks to either the intent or 
the effects of the law requiring military service. The principal case setting forth this 
approach is Zolfagharkhani v. Canada29 involving an Iranian who did not want to 
serve in the military of his country after he learned that the government intended to 
use chemical warfare against the Kurds.30 The Court ruled that “the . . . defi nition 
of Convention refugee makes the intent (or any principal effect) of an ordinary law 
of general application . . . relevant to the existence of persecution.”31 Canadian 
tribunals have consistently applied an interpretation contemplating protection in 
cases involving objections to military service based on religion or belief.32
However, recent claims by American servicemen, Jeremy Hinzman and 
Brandon David Hughey, who have refused service in Iraq because of their genuine 
political convictions have not resulted in protection. The cases, Hinzman v. 
Canada33, and Hughey v. Canada34 examined the criteria set forth in Handbook 
para. 171; namely that “the type of military action, with which an individual 
does not with to be associated, is condemned by the international community as 
contrary to basic rules of human conduct[.]” The applicants raised two broad bases 
for their claims that they met this criteria, arguing that: (1) the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq constituted an illegal war, and on that fact alone they met the standard, and 
(2) violations of rules of war were suffi ciently pervasive to establish a suffi cient 
likelihood of being directly implicated in activities contrary to basic rules of 
human conduct.
Among the arguments made to support the assertion that the war itself was 
illegal, one of the claimants submitted affi davits from international law experts, 
who pointed to the lack of a U.N. Security Council approval for the invasion, 
and noted that the U.N. Charter only permits the use of force by a country 
in cases of self-defense, or with Security Council approval. On the issue of the 
pervasiveness of humanitarian law violations, the claimants pointed to reports by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (IRRC), Human Rights Watch, and 
Amnesty International. Mr. Hughey also submitted evidence about the treatment 
of prisoners at Guantánamo, Cuba, the practice of torture at Abu Ghraib prison 
in Iraq, and legal opinions by the U.S. Department of Justice which suggested 
that the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment, might not apply to “enemy combatants” held by the United States.
The court denied Hinzman’s claim rejecting both arguments. It ruled that the 
illegality of the war could not be called upon as a basis for a “mere foot soldier”35 
and that there was no evidence to show that the “breaches of international 
humanitarian law that have been committed by American soldiers in Iraq … rise 
to the level of being either systematic or condoned by the state.”36 It relied upon 
this latter fi nding to rule that there was insuffi cient evidence to establish that 
the military action in which he could be involved would be “condemned by the 
international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct.”
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The court in Hughey also denied the applicant’s claim, but it did leave the 
door somewhat open. On the issue of the illegality of a war being relevant in 
cases involving foot soldiers, the court cited to its earlier decision, Al-Maisri v. 
Canada,37 in ruling that the issue was “not entirely free from doubt”38 and it 
certifi ed the question. However, it ruled in concert with the Hinzman court on 
the question of the likelihood of involvement with acts contrary to basic rules of 
conduct, observing that he had not established that the U.S. engaged in “systematic 
violations of humanitarian law.”39
A broader human rights perspective on these cases is provided by a 2005 
Amnesty International briefi ng on the case of Jeremy Hinzman. After stating 
its position that the right to refuse military service for reasons of conscience is 
“inherent in the notion of freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” and 
expressing its assessment of Mr. Hinzman as a genuine conscientious objector, AI 
concludes that if he were to be forcibly returned to the U.S. and imprisoned, it 
would “adopt him as a prisoner of conscience.”40
United Kingdom
In Sepet v. Secretary of State for the Home Department41 the House of Lords 
considered a case involving two Kurdish asylum seekers who objected to military 
service in Turkey where they believed they would be compelled to fi ght against 
fellow Kurds and engage in acts contrary to international norms. The claim was 
analyzed as one premised on “political” objections under U.N. Handbook 
para. 171, and was denied on the basis of a failure to show international 
condemnation of Turkish military action against the Kurds.
In a subsequent case, Krotov v. Secretary of State for the Home Department42 
the federal court moved jurisprudence in a positive direction by shifting the 
emphasis away from the requirement of an international condemnation to that 
of an evaluation of the military action within a human rights framework. Krotov 
involved the claim for refugee status of a citizen of the Russian Federation who 
deserted from military service in the Chechen war. In rejecting the requirement of 
international condemnation, the court noted that to “hinge the test on international 
condemnation would mean having to assess military service cases ... on the basis 
of the vagaries of international politics, apt to vary depending on shifting alliances 
and whether other countries surveying the confl ict take a particular view.”43
The court observed that a “test based directly in international law” would 
be more consistent with the “overall framework” of the Refugee Convention, 
and noted that to do otherwise would be to “subvert...underlying principles of 
interpretation set out by the House of Lords in Horvath.... which seek to base 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention on fundamental norms and values drawn 
from international law sources, in particular international human rights law….”44
After having ruled that the proper test is not whether the international 
community has offi cially condemned the action, but whether it contravenes 
accepted legal standards, the court identifi ed “core humanitarian norms” which 
govern such determination, including Common art. 3 to the Geneva Convention 
of 1949, and its Additional Protocol II. If acts prohibited by these instruments are 





ollege of the L
aw






Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 26, Issue 2 © UNHCR 2007, all rights reserved 75
“committed on a systemic basis as an aspect of deliberate policy, or as a result of 
offi cial indifference to the widespread actions of a brutal military” the individual 
who has a well-founded fear of punishment for refusal to participate will come 
within the refugee defi nition.
New Zealand
In the past, New Zealand took an approach similar to that of the U.S. It cited 
the fact that military service is imposed by way of a law of universal application 
to rule that neither the service itself nor punishment for refusal was linked to 
a Convention reason.45 On this basis it denied claims of a Russian citizen with 
religious and moral objections to serving in Chechnya;46 a national of Ukraine and 
the Russian Federation with religious objections to serving in Chechyna;47 and two 
separate cases of Jehovah’s Witnesses from South Korea.48
Subsequently the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) modifi ed its 
position, concluding that an intent to persecute was not required; what was 
required was only a showing that the “Convention-protected ground was a 
‘contributing cause’ to the risk of being persecuted.49 In addition to the shift away 
from requirement of proof of intent, the RSAA “reaffi rmed its preference for 
determining refugee status issues via what has become known as the ‘human rights 
approach[.]’”50
The RSAA employed this approach to rule in favor of a Kurdish conscientious 
objector from Turkey. In deciding the case, the RSAA referred to the “proposition 
that no one can be compelled to undertake military service where a real chance 
exists that this will require the refugee claimant to commit human rights abuses.”51 
It reached the conclusion that such a risk existed in light of “the history of the 
confl ict, attendant breaches of the laws of war on a widespread scale in the past 
and a continuing climate of impunity for those who commit the breaches[.]”52 The 
likelihood of being compelled to commit humanitarian law violations transformed 
his potential imprisonment for resisting service into persecution for a Convention 
reason.
The European Union
One scholar, Cecilia Bailliet, has noted that developments regarding conscientious 
objection within the European Union display a type of “schizophrenia.”53 Bailliet 
refers to encouragement of members by the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly “to adopt national legislation recognizing the right of conscientious 
objection as derived from fundamental rights of the individual[.]”54 However, 
at the same time, the Council of the European Union adopted a Qualifi cation 
Directive which provides for refugee status for draft resisters or evaders which is far 
more limited than that recommended by the UNHCR.
The Qualifi cation Directive, at Art. 9(1) defi nes persecution; prosecution or 
punishment for refusal to perform military service only constitutes persecution 
“where performing military service would include crimes or acts falling under 
the exclusion clauses[.]”55 Whereas the UNHCR recommends refugee status 
whenever the military service is contrary to “genuine political, religious or moral 
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convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience”56 the Directive limits it to those 
extreme circumstances where the individual would be engaged in crimes against 
peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes, or acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
This position has been criticized by UNHCR as well as the European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). In its criticism UNHCR reiterated its long-held 
position that punishment for refusal to perform military service “may also be 
considered to be persecutory, if the reasons for refusal are based on deeply held 
moral, religious, or political convictions.”57 ECRE lamented that the Qualifi cation 
Directive limited itself to “scenarios where individuals would be required to commit 
war crimes or other serious crimes as part of their military service” and considered 
it “unfortunate that the original wording of the Commission proposal was not 
retained which allowed for the reasons for the refusal to perform military service to 
be based on deeply held moral, religious, or political convictions” which would be 
consistent with the “UNHCR Handbook and evolving human rights laws.”58
CONCLUSION
One of the most fundamental moral choices an individual can make is whether 
to kill another human being. Service in the military confronts the individual with 
this possibility, and raises profound questions of conscience. It is encouraging that 
there is a greater recognition that conscientious objection is a legitimate exercise 
of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. However, the refugee 
practice of many countries continue to interpret the law in a way which denies 
protection to genuine conscientious objectors. State practice should better refl ect 
the guidance and recommendations of UNHCR, and avoid overly formalistic 
analyses which result in the limiting protection to young men who do not wish 
to bear arms.
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